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ADMIRALTY TORT JURISDICTION-AIRPLANE CRASHES INTO
NAVIGABLE WATERS WITHIN STATE TERRITORIAL LIMITS
The United States Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power shall
extend . . . to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . ,, 1 The
Congress, in establishing a court system, provided that "the district courts
shall have . . . exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction ... saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a
common law remedy...." 2
It is the purpose of this comment to trace the development and present
application of rules governing jurisdiction of suits arising from crashes of
aircraft into navigable waters within the territorial limits of the states.
As a result of The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,3 decided in 1851, and The
Daniel Ball,4 decided in 1870, admiralty gained jurisdiction over all lakes
and rivers which are unaffected by the tides, but which are navigable waters
of the United States, i.e., those capable5 of carrying interstate commerce. 6
Admiralty jurisdiction generally encompasses actions in either tort or con-
tract,7 and suits based on contract are cognizable only where there is a mari-
time connection.8 Admiralty tort jurisdiction, however, has traditionally
depended on the site of the tort,9 the rule of locality, or the locality test,
which usually has referred to the site of the injury as opposed to the place
of negligence or cause.10
I U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 11.
3 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
477 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
5 There are three tests for capability in relation to navigable waters:
(a) Currently navigable interstate. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
(b) Historically navigable interstate but not currently. Madole v. Johnson, 241 F.
Supp. 379 (W.D. La. 1965). See also United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co,
311 U.S. 377 (1940).
(c) Potentially navigable (reasonably so) interstate. United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
6 For a detailed discussion on the historical development of waters within admiralty
jurisdiction in the United States, see 7A J. MoORa, FmERAL PRAcriCE .200 [3],
[4], (2d ed. 1972).
7 See G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, §§ 1-10 (1957); Black, Ad-
miralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 259, 264 (1950).
SThe Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851); DeLovio v. Boit,
7 F. Cas. 418, 426, No. 3776 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
9 7A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, .325 [3] at 3521 (1972).
10 See 2 CJ.S. Admiralty § 63 (1972).
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Fifteen years after The Genesee Chief, the Supreme Court decided the
case of The Plymouth," and since that time courts have had difficulty in-
terpreting the locality test. The Plymouth involved a fire, begun on board
a ship, which spread to a dock and destroyed a warehouse thereon. Holding
that admiralty lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, the Court said "the wrong
and injury complained of must have been committed wholly upon the high
seas or navigable waters, or, at least, the substance and consummation of
the same must have taken place upon these waters to be within the admiralty
jurisdiction." ' 2 The wrong complained of here was the burning of a ware-
house, located on a dock, an extension of the land, and thus not within ad-
miralty tort jurisdiction.'3 Noting that "[t] he jurisdiction of the admiralty
over martime torts does not depend upon the wrong having been committed
on board the vessel, but upon its having been committed upon the high seas
or other navigable waters," 14 the Court rejected the argument that the
origin of the wrongful act is the place from which jurisdiction is derived.'5
Significantiy, the Court stated: "Every species of tort, however occurring,
and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable
waters, is of admiralty cognizance." 16 This has been quoted repeatedly as
authority for the proposition that the rule of locality is the sole test for tort
jurisdiction in admiralty, and it may well be that the Court intended it as
such.' 7
As one can see from The Plymouth, situations arise in which negligence
or a wrongful act and damage or injury do not both occur on water or on
land. Although these "split torts" have created much difficulty for the
courts, the general rule has evolved, based on The Plymouth, that admiralty
will take jurisdiction where the injury occurs on navigable waters, without
regard to the origin of the wrongful act or negligence. Prior to the Exten-
"170 US. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).
12 Id. at 35.
13 For cases holding a tort occurring on an extension of land is not within admiralty,
see 1 BENEDicr, Tim LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY, § 128a (6th ed. 1940).
14 70 US. (3 Wall.) at 35.
15 "[Tlhe simple fact that it originated there, [on navigable waters] but, the whole
damage done upon land, the cause of action not being complete on navigable waters,
affords no ground for the exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction." Id. at 36.
10 Id.
17The Court cited without unfavorable comment a famous quote from an opinion
by Justice Story, the Supreme Court's acknowledged expert on admiralty at that
time:
In regard to torts, I have always understood that the jurisdiction of the ad-
miralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act. The admiralty has
not, and never, I believe, deliberately claimed to have, any jurisdiction over torts,
except such as are maritime torts; that is, torts upon the high seas, or on waters
within the ebb and flow of the tide. Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960, No.
13902 (C.CD. Me. 1813), in The Plymouth, 70 US. (3 Wall.) at 33-34.
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sion of Admiralty Act,18 the heirs of one who had been injured on a dock
and had drowned after falling off had no cause of action in admiralty, even
though the decedent was struck by a cargo sling of a ship,19 because the
drowning resulted from an impact that occurred on an extension of land.
In contrast, when one standing on a vessel is injured in a similar manner,
admiralty has jurisdiction.20
These examples illustrate only a few of the problems inherent in maritime
tort jurisdiction; 21 questions of jurisdiction remain unsettled, as they have
for more than 120 years.22
Another area of admiralty law, similarly troublesome from its origin,
concerns the occurrence of injury or death when an aircraft touches or
passes over navigable waters. Clearly actions for wrongful death arising
from airplane crashes beyond one marine league 3 from shore may be brought
in admiralty under the Death on the High Seas Act.24 Indeed, plaintiffs
seeking damages for personal injuries may sue in admiralty where the tort
1846 U.S.C. § 740 (1948). The act gave admiralty jurisdiction over damage or in-
juries caused by vessels.
19 T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
20 Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935).
21 For other questions see notes 56 & 57, infra (swimming injuries not connected with
maritime commerce); Hastings v. Mann, 226 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.N.C. 1964) (whether
one injured while standing in water can bring an action in admiralty).
22 See, e.g., BEEDicr, ADMIRALTY, 173 (1850), written in the days when the rule of
strict locality was rarely questioned. By the turn of the twentieth century, one author
had noted the existence of two American cases holding that locality was not the sole
test. R. HuGHss, ADMIRALTY at 216-17 (1901). Although there were lower- court cases
requiring the relation to a vessel or its owners, the author dismissed them and held to
the locality rule. Id. at 195, 220. For an example of modern works favoring abolitiop
of the strict locality rule, see 7A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrncE, $l .325 [2], [3], [5] (2d
ed. 1972); Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoLUM. L. REv.
259, 264 (1950). Nevertheless, most modem works consider the strict locality rule well
entrenched. See, e.g., 1 KREa INDER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, § 2.10 (1971).
23 A marine league equals "one-twentieth part of a degree of latitude, or three geo-
graphical or nautical miles." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1120 (4th ed. 1968). The Death
on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761 et seq. (1958), specifically applies only to the
high seas beyond one league from shore.
24 See, D'Aleman v. Pan Am. World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958); Trihey
v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957); Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th
Cir. 1955); Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Pardonnet
v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 683 (N.D.Ill. 1964); Blumenthal v. United States,
189 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.Pa. 1960), aff'd, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. .1962); Lavello v. Danko,
175 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), Noel v. Airponents, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.J.
1958); Stiles v Airlines, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.La. 1958), -aff'd, 268 F.2d 400 (5th
Cir. 1959); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Calif. 1954); Lacey v.
L. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 459, appeal denied, 293 N.Y.
878, 49 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1943).
has occurred beyond the one league limit, even though the Death on High
Seas Act does not apply.
25
However, the problem that arises where an aircraft plunges into navigable
waters within one marine league from shore26 has not been easily solved.
Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines27 began a decade of great uncertainty in this
facet of aviation and admiralty law. An Eastern airliner took off from a
Boston airport on a Boston to Philadelphia flight, and crashed into Boston
harbor, in navigable waters within one marine league from the shore, kill-
ing and injuring various passengers and members of the crew. In a suit
brought under admiralty jurisdiction in a Pennsylvania federal district
court, alleging Eastern's negligence in maintenance, operation and control
of the aircraft,28 the court held that "in the absence of statute, a maritime
locality plus some maritime connection is necessary for admiralty jurisdic-
tion." 29 On appeal, the circuit court reversed, holding that admiralty tort
jurisdiction depends solely on locality. "If the tort occurred on navigable
waters, the claim is one that lies within the jurisdiction of the courts of
admiralty; nothing more is required." 30
Giving new life to the strict locality theory, Weinstein became a major
source authority for those espousing this view.31 Nevertheless, other courts
cited the holding with disapproval,3 2 adopting the "locality-plus" test 33
One should note that this principle has been established, even though the act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 761, et seq., does not mention airplanes or airplane crashes.
25 See Horton v. J. & J. Aircraft, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1966); Notarian
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D.Pa. 1965); Bergeron v. Aero
Associates, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 936 (E.D.La. 1963).
2 It is well to note here that the Death on the High Seas Act does not apply "to the
Great Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any State, or to any navi-
gable waters in the Panama Canal Zone." 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1920).
27203 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.Pa. 1962), rev'd in part, 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
2 SLibellants also alleged breach of warranty and breach of contract; however, con-
sideration of these grounds is beyond the scope of this comment.
29 203 F. Supp. at 433.
30 316 F.2d at 761.
31See, e.g., Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968); Kropp v.
Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Harris v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 431 (SD.Ia. 1967); Horton v. J. & J. Aircraft, Inc, 257 F. Supp. 120
(S.D.Fla. 1966); Utzinger v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1965).32 See, e.g., Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967);
Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.Tex. 1968). Some other cases cite Chapman
and/or McGuire as authority without mentioning Weinstein. See, e.g., Peytavin v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972); Gowdy v. United States,
412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969); J. W. Peterson Coal & Oil Co. v. United States, 323 F.
Supp. 1198 (N.D.IU. 1970); O'Connor and Co. v. City of Pascagoula, 304 F. Supp. 681
(S.D. Miss. 1969); Hastings v. Mann, 226 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
as Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co, 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972); Gowdy
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with some leaning toward abandoning locality for certain torts unconnected
with maritime commerce.8 4
The next action arising from an aircraft crash in navigable waters, Rapp
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,85 like Weinstein, was the result of a crash in Boston
Harbor. The district court followed Weinstein on the question of juris-
diction without discussion.36 On appeal, as in Scott v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc.,37 the decision on that question was affirmed, both initially 88 and upon
rehearing.3 A similar case, Harris v. United Airlines, Inc.,40 involved a
crash in Lake Michigan within the territorial limits of Illinois. The court,
relying on Weinstein and Scott, said "the weight of authority is that locality
alone determines whether or not a tort claim is within admiralty jurisdic-
tion." 41 A third case, Hornsby v. The Fishmeal Co.;1 arose from a crash
of two small aircraft above waters of the Gulf of Mexico (within the one
marine league limit). The district court judge summarily held admiralty
had jurisdiction, citing Weinstein as authority 48 The court of appeals
tacitly affirmed this finding,44 although reversing the lower court as to the
case's result.
Two other cases, not strictly within the scope of the instant discussion,
merit some comment. One, Horton v. J. & 1. Aircraft, Inc.,4 5 involved
a plane crash on the high seas. Because the libel was for personal injury,
it did not come within the Death on the High Seas Act, thus necessitating
the use of reasoning along the lines of Weinstein in order to invoke juris-
diction. The court cited the Weinstein analogy to the "cases where the
Federal Courts have taken admiralty jurisdiction of deaths due to plane
crashes under the Death on the High Seas Act ... " 413 and concurred with
that rationale. The opinion noted that "the Supreme Court has held that
in tort, admiralty jurisdiction depends entirely on locality," 47 citing At-
v. United States, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969); J. W. Peterson Coal & Oil Co. v. United
States, 323 F. Supp. 1198 (N.D.Ill. 1970).
34See Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111, 114-15 (S.D. Tex. 1968), in which the
court promotes the idea of abandoning the locality test altoghether.
35 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D.Pa. 1967).
36 Id. at 680.
37 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968).
38 Id. at 17.
Id. at 25.
40 275 F. Supp. 431 (S.D.Ia. 1967).
41 Id. at 432.
42 285 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.La. 1968).
43 Id. at 993.
44 431 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1970).
45 257 F. Supp. 120 (SD.Fla. 1966).
46 Id. at 121.
471d.
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lantic Transport Co. of West Virginia v. Imbrovek.48 However, Imbrovek
would seem doubtful authority for this proposition.4 9
The other case, Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,50 came within the Death
on the High Seas Act. Although numerous cases have held such an event
to be the basis for a libel in admiralty,51 and none have held contra, the
court nevertheless devoted a great deal of attention to the issue of juris-
diction, refusing, unlike some other courts,52 to overlook queries posed
regarding the strict locality test.03 However, Kropp concurred with Wein-
stein's findings with little objection, stating that "the exercise by this court
of admiralty jurisdiction under the [Death on the High Seas Act] is clearly
warranted." 54
As cursory perusal of the cases in the area will reveal, Weinstein's basic
premise, strict locality, has not been embraced universally. One of the first
cases to challenge the apparent citadel was McGuire v. City of New York, 5
in which the district court held that an injury sustained by a swimmer
vwas not cognizable in admiralty. Stating that "[t] he basis for admiralty
jurisdiction must be a combination of a maritime wrong and a maritime
location," 51 the district judge found that a swimmer on navigable waters
has no such maritime connection, and dismissed the libel for lack of juris-
diction. The opinion expounded further:
That a tort may have occurred on navigable waters is merely a prima
facie test of admiralty jurisdiction. . . .s Not every tort committed
48 234 U.S. 52, 59 (1914).
49 See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
G0 329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Mx See note 23 supra.
52 See, e.g., Hornsby v. Fishmeal Co., 285 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.La. 1968); Harris v.
United Airlines, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 431 (S.D.Ia. 1967); Rapp v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D.Pa. 1967); Horton v. J. & J. Aircraft, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 120
(S.D.Fla. 1966).
53 See note 70 infra concerning the finding of a maritime connection in Weinstein.
The court in Kropp also raised questions it believed to be unsettled:
(a) Whether an occurrence above the surface is within admiralty, 329 F. Supp. 447
at 454, and,
(b) if a maritime location is a necessity, whether the mere factor of location imparts
a maritime connection. The court accepted without protest the third circuit's finding
in Weinstein that such a circumstance is sufficient. ld. at 454.
54 329 F. Supp. 447 at 455.
55 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
SOld. at 868. For cases holding contra, see Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach,
251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.Fla. 1965); King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D.Tenn.
1963).
57 192 F. Supp. 866, at 870. One should note here that in addition to citing Sydney
Blumenthal & Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1929), as source authority for
this proposition, the court also cited Imbrovek. Imbrovek has been cited by proponents
19731
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:538
on admiralty waters may be redressed in the admiralty courts. Only
those which have a maritime character, which deal with a maritime
subject matter, are properly within admiralty jurisdiction.18
In a continuing barrage, the court referred to the authors of treatises"9
who had expressed dissatisfaction with the strict locality rule and who had
urged the requirement of a vessel. 60 The opinion, summarizing its holding,
suggested that "the guide to admiralty jurisdiction must be the needs of the
sea or the needs of seagoing commerce." 61
The effect of McGuire was to give courts disgruntled over the strict
locality point of view a new angle of attack and another source of au-
thority.6 2 Until recently, however, none of the cases following this "lo-
cality-plus" theory have involved aircraft crashes.
It is valuable to digress to observe some of the difficulties in the area that
have not yet been resolved.63 First, has the United States Supreme Court
actually endorsed the strict locality theory? As noted previously,"4 two
cases in particular have been considered by many subsequent decisions to
have embraced that test. Both The Plymouth and Imbrovek contained lan-
guage to this effect, but the decisions following McGuire took exception to
this interpretation. In Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 5 for ex-
ample, the court pointed out that Mr. Justice Hughes' opinion in Imbrovek
of each side of the jurisdiction test argument as the Supreme Court's recognition of
the side espoused.
58 192 F. Supp. 866 at 870-71.
59 See ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY, §§ 8, 9 (1939); 1 BENEDICr, THE LAW OF AMEICAN
ADMIRALTY, § 61 (6th ed. 1940); and footnote 21 supra.
'O 192 F. Supp. 866, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The court referred twice to a connection
with a vessel and cited three passages from Robinson (note 59 supra), stating the im-
portance of a connection with a vessel. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 279 U.S. 109 (1929), held that the injury sued on need not have
been committed on board a vessel. It appears that the opinion is looking at a connec-
tion with maritime commerce in general, rather than with a vessel in particular.
61 192 F. Supp. 866 at 871.
62 Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967); Smith
v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Hastings v. Mann, 226 F. Supp. 962
(E.D.N.C. 1964). Other cases cited Chapman's decision on this point. See, e.g., Pey-
tavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972); Gowdy v.
United States, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969); J. W. Peterson Coal & Oil Co. v. United
States, 323 F. Supp. 1198 (N.D.Il. 1970); O'Connor and Co. v. City of Pascagoula, 304
F. Supp. 681 (S.D.Miss. 1969).
03 "Not yet" here means prior to December, 1972. This date is relevant in that some
problems were clarified in a case decided in December of that year. See notes 77,
et seq., and accompanying text.
6
4 See notes 17 and 57 supra.
65 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967) (suit brought subsequent to injury sustained by swim-
mer who dove from pier into 18 inches of water).
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stated that the tort had a maritime connection, thus avoiding a situation
where the Court would have to select one or the other.66
Second, several courts have noted67 that most courts touting strict local-
ity, including Weinstein, have "gone the extra mile" and found a maritime
connection, although they state that this is not required in order for ad-
miralty jurisdiction to be asserted. 68
Some see a third difficulty in that the Extension of Admiralty Act69 draws
"into the tort jurisdiction cases of injury to person or property 'caused by a
vessel,' whether or not 'done or consummated on land,' "7 thus abrogating
the rule of strict locality.71
Thus the question was ripe for determination 72 when another passenger
jet fell into the navigable waters of Lake Erie, within the territorial limits of
Ohio. The resultant litigation, Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland,73 was dismissed by the district court for want of admiralty juris-
diction,74 and appeal to the sixth circuit produced the same result.75 All
was left to the Supreme Court.76
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stewart concluded
that the mere fact that the alleged wrong "occurs" or "is located" on
or over navigable waters-whatever that means in an aviation context-
is not of itself sufficient to turn an airplane negligence case into a "mari-
time tort." It is far more consistent with the history and purpose of
admiralty to require also that the wrong bear a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity. We hold that unless such a relation-
66 234 U.S. 52, at 61. See note 68 infra.
6 7 See, e.g., Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967);
Smith v. Guerran, 290 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.Tex. 1968). It should be noted that the same
point was argued before the Supreme Court in 1914 and noted in the Court's opinion
in Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 60 (1914).
OsSee, e.g., Atlantic Trans. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 61 (1914); Weinstein v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 763 (3d Cir. 1963); and Davis v. City of Jackson-
ville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327, 328 (M.D.Fla. 1965).
6 946 US.C. § 740 (1948).
70 Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoLuM. L. REv. 259,
264 n. 30 (1950).
71 Id.
72 As shown later, it was so ripe that the Court may have gone further than neces-
sary, thus breaking its customary rule of deciding as little as possible in order to dispose
of the case. See note 79 infra.
73 448 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 93 S. Ct. 493 (1972).
74 The court stated that admiralty jurisdiction could not apply, even under the strict
locality test, because the sea gulls were sucked in by the engines while the craft was
over land. Id. at 154.
76 Id.
76 Cert. granted, 405 U.S. 915 (1972).
19731
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:538
ship exists, claims arising from airplane accidents are not cognizable in
admiralty in the absence of legislation to the contrary.77
The Court additionally stated that traditional maritime activity cannot
be established by the theory employed in Weinstein,78 viz., that the craft
upon striking the water is endangered by the hazards of the sea such that
admiralty jurisdiction should attach.
Although the dangers . . . faced by a plane that has crashed . . .
may be superficially similar to those encountered by a sinking ship, the
plane's unexpected descent will almost invariably have been attrib-
utable to a cause unrelated to the sea . . . and the determination of
liability will thus be based on factual and conceptual inquiries un-
familiar to the law of admiralty.79
The Court, however, leaving open several aspects, did not completely
eliminate the possibility of aviation torts ever being held to have the required
maritime nexus.80 Further, the ruling appears to apply only to aircraft, thus
leaving in doubt the question of whether strict locality is gone forever.
Moreover, Justice Stewart called for Congressional legislation to clarify
aviation law in general. Finally, the last sentence of the opinion raised an-
other problem when it held "that, in the absence of legislation to the con-
trary, there is no federal admiralty jurisdiction over aviation tort claims
arising from flights by land-based aircraft between points within the conti-
nental United States (emphasis added)." 81
This holding would indicate that the Court did not intend the ruling to
apply to international flights. Accordingly, litigation involving the crash
of an airliner, departing Washington for London, into the navigable waters
of the Potomac River, apparently would not be restricted by the holding
of Executive Jet. Fortunately, Justice Stewart did make clear that "under
the Death on the High Seas Act, a wrongful death action arising out of an
airplane crash on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of a
State may clearly be brought in a federal admiralty court," 82 thus keeping
that aspect of the problem free from doubt.
7793 S.Ct. 493, 504 (1972). One should observe that the Court of Appeals refused
to rule on the question of necessity of a maritime nexus, agreeing with the holding of
the district court as to where the craft encountered the birds, and feeling that this
foreclosed the need of such a finding.
78 See 316 F.2d at 763; 448 F.2d at 163-64.
79 93 S. Ct. at 505.
8old. at 505-06.
81 Id. at 507.
821d. at 506 n.20.
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One other question remains unresolved: where does the tort occur? Al-
though the concurring opinion at the circuit court level of Executive Jet
considered this problem,83 the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to de-
cide, stating that because both theories raise the question of whether a
martime nexus is required, the Court need not choose either view.84 The
problem remains whether the tort occurs at the point of first impact, or
at the point where the injury actually is inflicted.85
The longstanding conflict on this point arises from statements in prior
cases that, within the confines of the locality test, jurisdiction lies where
the alleged negligence takes effect. According to The Plymouth, "takes ef-
fect" refers to the place where the substance and consummation of the
damage occurs.s6 In contrast, the opinions in Thomas v. Lane 7 and T.
Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor8 speak of the point of first impact in deciding
where the tort occurs.
The facts in Executive Jet posed an ideal opportunity for the Court to
decide which view to use. Immediately upon takeoff and while still over
land, sea gulls were sucked into the engines, causing the plane to lose alti-
tude and fall into Lake Erie. Thus, the first impact occurred over land, the
substance and consummation, on navigable water. Unfortunately, the Court
characteristically refused to decide all questions raised, leaving for the future
this determination. 89
83 448 F.2d at 154-55. See Wiper v. Great Lakes Eng'r Works, 340 F.2d 727 (6th Cir.
1965), where a man drowned subsequent to tripping on a negligently maintained dock.
The court held, inter alia, that
the decedent was on land at the time he was caused to fall. Thus the tort was
complete before the decedent ever touched the water and this being true, the
subsequent drowning is significant not to determine the maritime or non-maritime
nature of this action but only as it relates to damages. Id. at 730.
The court cited for authority The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865); Cleveland
Terminal & Valley R.R. Co. v. Cleveland SS Co., 208 U.S. 316 (1908).
For the facts in The Plymouth, see note 11 supra, and accompanying text. The
Cleveland Terminal case arose from vessels swept downstream by a flood, striking and
damaging a bridge. The Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court's dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction, stated that the damage occurred on an extension of land, thus by
the locality test eliminating admiralty jurisdiction.
84 93 S. Ct. at 504. See note 89 infra.
85 For an in-depth discussion of this question, see 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1569 (1972).
86 70 US. (3 Wall.) 20, at 35.
87 23 F. Cas. 957 (C.C.D. Me. 1813).
88 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
89 In the view we take of the question before us, we need not decide who has the
better of this dispute. It is enough to note that either position gives rise to the
problems inherent in applying the strict locality test of admiralty tort jurisdic-
non in aviation accident cases. 93 S. Ct. at 504.
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Apart from the particular aspects of admiralty tort jurisdiction, tort law
in general has been moving away from the old rule of lex loci delicti90 for
many years, and admiralty now seems to be following the other areas of
tort law.91
Even though this particular area of admiralty law is still more easily
described as gray rather than black and white, there is now a slight sharpen-
ing of the picture. It is suggested that Congressional action would be a
highly desirable alternative to the abdication of all policy to the courts in
this vital segment of maritime law. For there it may take decades and many
bad results to formulate a workable theory. Further, this is a field requiring
uniform legislation, because of the interstate commerce aspects and the over-
lapping at this point of aviation and admiralty law.
It is submitted that Congress would do well to attempt to create some
uniform method of treating all claims for personal injury, death, or prop-
erty damage arising from aircraft accidents. The sheer volume of cases
grows daily and the determination of jurisdiction at present leaves much to
be desired. Indeed, serious consideration should be given to separate federal
court rules for aircraft cases because of the immensely technical nature of
many of the questions involved.
S.H.M.
90 "The law of the place where the crime or wrong took place" B. Acx's LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1056 (4th ed. 1968).
91 For a discussion of lex loci delicti, see 5 U. RicH. L. REv. 331 (1971).
